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ABSTRACT
Aggression in online social networks has been studied up to now,
mostly with several machine learning methods which detect such
behavior in a static context. However, the way aggression diffuses
in the network has received little attention as it embeds modeling
challenges. In fact, modeling how aggression propagates from one
user to another, is an important research topic since it can enable ef-
fective aggression monitoring, especially in media platforms which
up to now apply simplistic user blocking techniques.
In this paper, we focus on how to model aggression propaga-
tion on Twitter, since it is a popular microblogging platform at
which aggression had several onsets. We propose various methods
building on two well-known diffusion models, Independent Cascade
(IC) and Linear Threshold (LT ), to study the aggression evolution
in the social network. We experimentally investigate how well
each method can model aggression propagation using real Twitter
data, while varying parameters, such as users selection for model
seeding, weigh users’ edges, users’ activation timing, etc. Based
on the proposed approach, the best performing strategies are the
ones to select seed users with a degree-based approach, weigh user
edges based on overlaps of their social circles, and activate users
while considering their aggression levels. We further employ the
best performing models to predict which ordinary real users could
become aggressive (and vice versa) in the future, and achieve up to
AUC=0.89 in this prediction task. Finally, we investigate methods
for minimizing aggression, by launching competitive cascades to
“inform” and “heal” aggressors. We show that IC and LT models
can be used in aggression minimization, thus providing less intru-
sive alternatives to the blocking techniques currently employed by
popular online social network platforms.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems → Social networks; World Wide Web;
• Computing methodologies→ Network science; Modeling and
simulation.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM
must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish,
to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a
fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
CIKM’20, 19-23 October 2020, Galway, Ireland
© 2020 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
KEYWORDS
social networks, information diffusion, aggression modeling, ag-
gression minimization, cascades, immunization
ACM Reference Format:
Marinos Poiitis, Athena Vakali, and Nicolas Kourtellis. 2020. On the Ag-
gression Diffusion Modeling and Minimization in Online Social Networks.
In Proceedings of 29th ACM International Conference on Information and
Knowledge Management (CIKM’20). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 11 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
1 INTRODUCTION
Online social media offer unprecedented communication opportuni-
ties, but also come with unfortunate malicious behaviors. Cyberbul-
lying, racism, hate speech and discrimination are some of the online
aggressive, abusive or inappropriate behaviors manifesting in such
platforms, and often have devastating consequences for individual
users, and the society as a whole. Aggression can be explicit or im-
plicit in the way it is expressed, through posting of negative views
and feelings (e.g., anger, distrust or sadness), inappropriate content
(e.g., posting of embarrassing photos or videos), or unconsciously
(e.g., through negative gossip spreading) hurting online users. This
phenomenon is critical and vital since it challenges online trust in
many ways. Online permanence, Hidden influence and Omnipresence
are among the core traits of aggression, which are difficult to rec-
ognize, or even observe [24]. Overall, online social media users are
often left exposed and vulnerable to potential aggression threats.
Inter-disciplinary studies have focused on cyberaggression and
cyberbullying from the perspective of social psychology, social and
computational sciences. They have proposed several theoretical
formulations [1, 24] based on well-studied theories of social learn-
ing and bonding, as well as the theory of planned behavior [17].
Furthermore, several applied machine learning models have been
proposed to detect such behavior, and help its mitigation in online
platforms (e.g. [5, 9, 12, 32]). Even with all this body of earlier work,
online aggression has not been uniformly defined, as remarked
in [8]. Hence, online aggression is formulated under varying ap-
proaches, depending on the severity of the aggressive behavior, the
type of platform and social interactions it facilitates, the power of
the aggressor over the victim, etc. In the majority of the aforemen-
tioned works, machine learning approaches are used, emphasizing
on the selection of particular user content and context features to
detect the behavior under study.
Interestingly, aggression in real life has been found to spread in
social circles, from one user to another due to aggressive peer influ-
ence, and even in a cascading fashion, possibly affecting multiple
users at the same time (e.g., minors in a family with aggressive par-
enthood). Therefore, the aggression’s overall effect can be stronger
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as it propagates through the network [14]. Surprisingly, and despite
its severity in the online world, aggression propagation in the cyber
space has gathered little attention, primarily due to the complexity
of the problem. This is evident from the lack of automated processes
in the popular media platforms to mitigate or completely eliminate
aggression’s negative effects, by only going as far as blocking or
reporting abusive users and removing inappropriate content [2].
The present work focuses on the online aggression propagation
problem and studies the complexities of capturing and modeling
aggression propagation. It considers the well known diffusion mod-
els of Independent Cascading (IC) and Linear Threshold (LT) as a
basis for capturing the aggression evolution as it spreads in a social
network [16]. We select these models as they provide the building
blocks for studying the diffusion process at its two fundamental
types of interactions: user-user (IC) and user-neighborhood (LT ).
To this end, we define appropriate parameters for formulation of
aggression-aware information diffusion models, and enabling a
thorough study of the aggression dynamics, and how they are af-
fected when controlling several user and network properties. More-
over, we show how IC and LT models can be used in aggression
minimization, providing less intrusive alternatives to the techniques
currently in use by various social media platforms.
In summary, the main contributions of this work are:
(1) C1: aggression cascading diffusion theoretical founda-
tion, by exploring IC andLT as the basic propagationmodels.
Upon them, the theoretical notions of user-user interaction,
initial user selection strategies and user propagation are in-
troduced and adjusted accordingly. The same models are also
adjusted as aggression minimization methods, and various
healing approaches are formulated (Section 3).
(2) C2: aggressionmodeling andminimization experimen-
tation on real data, by identifying the best parameter con-
figurations for both IC and LT through cosine similarity
performance tests and statistical validation for modeling, as
well as aggression reduction for minimization. Real data ex-
perimentation, extensive simulations, a modeling case study
as well as comparison to the blocking minimization methods
currently in use by social platforms support our findings
(Section 4).
(3) C3: neighborhood importance and central user detec-
tion are found as the most effective strategies which extend
both IC and LT principles. Specifically, neighborhood simi-
larity is shown to be themost appropriate criterion according
to which user relationships are formed. Additionally, the ini-
tiation of the diffusion process by users who are located at
the network’s core is shown to lead to the most effective
aggression propagation model. Finally, IC and LT model-
ing could be effective aggression minimization techniques,
achieving a reduction of ∼50% for IC and ∼15% for LT in
comparison to the user banning methods currently in place
by social media platforms (Section 4).
(4) C4: Simulation framework release for reproducibility
purposes and further experimentation or extensions1.
1https://anonymous.4open.science/r/c11fd39b-f5cd-48eb-99e8-0b2384cdbe69/
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the
related works are reviewed. Section 3 provides the theoretical foun-
dation of both aggression modeling and minimization. The experi-
mental evaluation is presented in Section 4 and Section 5 provides
a discussion of this work’s results and further improvements.
2 RELATEDWORK
Information diffusion has been originally studied by probabilistic
models [10, 23], which were advanced by considering a discrete op-
timization problem formulation driven by the well-known Indepen-
dent Cascade (IC) and Linear Threshold (LT ) diffusion models [16].
In these two models, the process unfolds in discrete time steps,
where each user is affected by a specific neighbor only once, and
each user can affect a set of users; hence the information spreads in a
cascading manner. Thus, these methods capture not only the neigh-
borhood influence, but also the cumulative influence of a user’s
social circle where online aggression phenomena can occur [14].
Opinion Dynamics (OD) is another family of information diffu-
sion models which studies the effects and conditions of information
propagation over the network. Under OD, the well studied Voter
model proposes that a user gets influenced by one of its neighbors
through a random "voting" process [11]. However, in contrast to
IC and LT, in Voter model a specific user can be activated multiple
times. Hence, specific conditions should be satisfied to ensure opin-
ion convergence or process termination. Another set of models are
the well known Susceptible, Infected, Recovered (SIR) models from
the field of epidemics. They are a generalization of IC , categorizing
users into the above three states and studying the transitions from
one state to another, under specific thresholds [30]. Both OD and
SIR are useful in understanding the dynamics of diffusion process
and determining proper aggression propagation models.
2.1 Influence Maximization
The above methods model information diffusion in a controlled
environment with no specific limitations. However, in many real
world scenarios there is scarcity in available resources, such as lim-
ited number of nodes that can be initially activated. Thus, another
research topic emerged, called influence maximization. Its main goal
is to maximize the expected influence in the network by discover-
ing the most influential users [3] and hence mitigating the effect
of the limitations. Under this context, the scarcity in resources is
translated into a fixed number of seed nodes that the propagation
process could be initiated from, to achieve maximum influence [27].
The main focus of influence maximization is the optimization
of the seed selection process itself by minimizing the selection
cost [6, 20], or even sustaining the spread of the cascade above a
specified threshold [20]. In this context, it has been shown that a
greedy algorithm outperforms methods based on network and node
properties [16]. However, the simple greedy version is infeasible
due to the high complexity that the inherent Monte Carlo simula-
tions introduce when applied on large network. Therefore, many
optimization methods have been proposed.
A significant improvement of the greedy algorithm is Cost-
Effective Lazy Forward selection (CELF) that leverages the math-
ematical set property called submodularity - proposing that the
difference an item makes when included in a set decreases as the
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size of the set increases - achieving an 700% improvement in execu-
tion time over the simple version [18]. Moreover, Single Discount
(SD) and Degree Discount (DD) heuristics outperform CELF in terms
of execution time by more than six orders of magnitude while main-
taining a high influence spread, constituting them appropriate for
big data analysis where time constraints are crucial [7]. In particu-
lar, SD finds the most central nodes based on an iterative selection
and removal process, while DD is fine-tuned towards IC model and
exploits its user activation probability.
The most significant efforts for influence maximization have
exploited both types of cascading models - IC and LT - and thus
these methods form a state-of-art baseline. However, beyond the
basic IC and LT generic seed strategies, there are also methods
inspired by natural phenomena. For example, Simulated Annealing
is an approach that optimizes the spread function of the diffu-
sion process both in terms of time and magnitude through a local
search algorithm [15]. Likewise, information diffusion has been
addressed through heat diffusion - a mechanism from the field
of Ferromagnetism - emulating heat dissemination from higher
to lower temperature objects [21]. The natural approaches have
introduced the decaying effect of time on a user’s influence and
they have largely inspired the Decaying Aggression Transfer healing
mechanism proposed in our work.
2.2 Competitive Cascades
In both information diffusion and influence maximization, the pres-
ence of a parallel, sometimes negative cascade has been mentioned.
Under this scenario, each cascade selects a seed set to initiate its
propagation. The two cascades evolve simultaneously and depend-
ing on the assumed hypotheses, they either compete to be the first
to activate a node or affect a node regardless of the competitor and
measure the impact at the end of both processes. These are known
as Competitive Cascades and help us formulate the first part of our
proposed aggression minimization process.
2.2.1 Competitive Influence Maximization. Considerable efforts
in competitive cascades have proposed models which set the ob-
jective to find a positive seed set that minimizes the spread of a
negative cascade [13, 33]. This problem is called Influence Blocking
Maximization (IBM) and has been addressed with both IC and LT .
However, in order to properly select the positive seed nodes, these
methods retrace to the discussed greedy algorithm of influence
maximization. To overcome the computational limitations, they
either propose tailor-made problem variations of IBM [33], or im-
prove the greedy version through model specific structures, such
as the Local Directed Acyclic Graph, applicable only on LT [13].
Furthermore, misinformation containment on LT - different term
to refer to IBM problem - has been addressed by introducing prefer-
ence - a metric defined by the user thresholds and the in-neighbors’
edge weights - to help a user decide which cascade to accept when
both competitive cascades satisfy the threshold requirements [34].
Moreover, to find the most prevalent cascade in an IC simultaneous
influence approach, the notion of authorities - users with high valid-
ity - has been proposed [4]. Specifically, it has been shown that the
positive cascade is the dominant one as valid information spreads
through authorities, while misinformation by less influential users.
However, the negative cascade’s spread starts from a single node
rather than a set of nodes. To overcome this obstacle, an optimized
greedy algorithm has been proposed, but still lacks approximation
guarantees of the optimal solution [33].
2.3 Immunization
Social media nowadays tend to address abusive behavior restriction
by blocking abusive users or posts. This preference is grounded on
either the simpler nature of those algorithms, or due to their more
straightforward application. Hence, apart from the competitive
cascades, the latest immunization or blocking algorithms are also
reviewed in this work and compared to discover the most efficient
approach in terms of aggression reduction.
State-of-the-art methods in the domain of immunization favor
algorithms based on linear algebra manipulation to exploit the
users who are responsible for the largest information spread in the
network. Specifically, for a large family of diffusion processes, it
has been shown that the only network parameter that determines
whether this diffusion would become an epidemic or not is the
largest eigenvalue λ of the adjacency matrix A [22]. By leveraging
this observation, many methods have progressed such as the Net-
Shield algorithm which introduces a ranking score called Shield
score to detect the most important abusive users [29]. Furthermore,
NetMelt transfers the problem to edge deletion, as node deletion is
more radical and intrusive [28]. However, such methods operate
offline, i.e., they capture the network state before the propagation
process starts, in contrast to competitive cascades that we propose.
2.4 Aggression Modeling and Minimization
Aggression modeling and minimization has been studied mostly
via machine learning approaches. Specifically, Twitter account fea-
tures have been used to detect and categorize phenomena such as
hate speech [32], while iterative and incremental crowdsourcing
techniques have been proposed to annotate abusive tweets [12].
Apart from user content and context, graph features such as peer
pressure and cumulative influence have also been highlighted [25].
Furthermore, a multi-class classifier has been used to study the clas-
sification among various types of abusive behavior such as racism
and homophobia [9], while Random Forests have been exploited
to detect other disturbing phenomena such as cyberbullying [5].
These efforts address online aggression using user content and con-
text features without correlating them to the aggression diffusion
process, thus neglecting its dynamics and effect on user behavior.
According to the authors knowledge, there is only a single ap-
proach which has examined the effect of online aggression diffusion
and it exploits OD models [26]. However, in social networks ag-
gression spreads through a user post based on this user’s social
circle. Hence, cascade models are more suitable than OD for aggres-
sion modeling, as they simulate a mass information dissemination
process rather than user-user interactions. Apart from aggression
modeling through cascades, to the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to address online aggression minimization. In particular,
two different minimization methods are explored here using: (a)
competitive cascades, (b) node/edge blocking. The second method
- which is what social media such as Twitter use nowadays [2] -
is compared to the proposed competitive cascades with respect to
aggression reduction efficiency.
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3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we provide the theoretical foundations for user
interactions, seed selection, aggression propagation and healing
mechanisms, and connect them to the diffusion and minimization
problems, as per Contribution 1.
3.1 Aggression Modeling
A social network is represented by a directed graph G = (V ,E),
where V is a set of n nodes or users, and E is a set of m edges,
i.e., relationships between users. Each node is associated with an
aggression score denoted byAi ∀vi ∈ V . The aim is to find whether
the IC and LT are able to model aggression diffusion and what are
the important parameters that enable them to do so.
3.1.1 Seed Selection. Under aggression diffusion modeling, the
seed selection process is the first crucial component to describe.
Seed nodes are the ones the diffusion process starts. The ultimate
result of the propagation model is tightly related to these initial
seed nodes. The necessity for selecting seed nodes is due to the
diffusion model being restricted by a given budget k , meaning that
we can only afford a specific amount of initial stimulation of k seed
nodes. As a result, a sophisticated seed selection strategy could
enable the diffusion process and lead to the increase of the number
of activated nodes. The proposed strategies are presented below:
• All Aggressive: Set all aggressive users as seed nodes.
• Top Aggressive: Set top k aggressive users as seed nodes,
where k is given by the user. If k > |aддressive users |, use
All Aggressive strategy.
• Single Discount (SD): Use algorithm presented in [7]. Iter-
atively, place the user with the highest degree in seed nodes
set, remove said node and proceed.
• Degree Discount (DD): Also presented in [7]. It works like
SD but it is fine grained towards IC model, taking advantage
of the prior activation probability.
• Random: Choose users as seeds randomly.
3.1.2 Weighting Scheme. Next step is to define the various weight-
ing schemes we apply on the network edges. Each scheme captures
real world properties that can impact the aggression diffusion in
a different way, as they can affect the probability of propagating
aggression. In the following, we assume that the user is embedded
in directional edges:
• Jaccard overlap (Jaccard): In social media, the friends and
followers of a user can heavily influence the user’s own
beliefs. If two connected users appear to have similar or
even identical social circles, this could point to very similar
beliefs or behaviors. Therefore, given two connected nodes
u and v , and their corresponding sets of neighbors Nu and
Nv , the Jaccard overlap of their edge is defined as weight
wuv =
Nu∩Nv
Nu∪Nv ∈ [0, 1].• Power score (Power): Given a node u, the Power score Pu
is defined as the ratio of the in-degree (incoming edges) over
out-degree (outgoing edges), Pu = inDeдr eeuoutDeдr eeu ∈ [0, 1]. The
higher the Power score of a node, the more dominant the
influence the node receives from its in-neighbors in com-
parison to the degree that it influences its out-neighbors.
However, for this measure to be applied as an edge weight, it
has to be considered in a pairwise fashion. Therefore, given
an edge from node u to v , we define Puv = PvPu ∈ [0, 1] to
capture v’s in-neighbor and u’s out-neighbor influence.
• Weighted overlap (Weighted): Given two nodes u and v ,
their Jaccard overlap wuv and their Power score Puv , the
Weighted overlap is defined as Pwuv = Puv ∗wuv ∈ [0, 1].
This metric combines the previous two weights.
Next, and using the above notations and metrics, we describe the
IC and LT diffusion models, given a constant seed budget k .
3.1.3 Independent Cascade (IC). At time step t = 0 the process
starts with an initial seed set S of active nodes with |S | ≤ k and
proceeds in discrete time steps according to the following stochastic
rule. At each time step t , a set of active nodes Activet are present
in the network. Each active node u ∈ Activet , that was activated in
time step t , has a single chance to activate each one of its inactive
neighbors, v , with probability p. This probability is defined with
respect to the very same notions that were introduced in weighting
schemes above. That is, nodev is activated by nodeu with:p ≤ wuv ,
p ≤ Puv or p ≤ Pwuv when the activation criterion is Jaccard,
Power or Weighted, respectively.
Under the aggressive IC model, activation means thatu transfers
its aggression score to user v , that is Av = Au . However, there
is a case where multiple nodes u ∈ Nv try to activate the same
node v simultaneously, and succeed. Then, the decision of whose
aggression score will be transferred follows one of the following
strategies:
• Random: The activation order is arbitrary and the aggres-
sion score of a randomly selected node u ∈ Nv from the
successful ones (i.e., Nv ∩ Activet ), is transferred to the
node being activated v .
• Top: The most aggressive node among the successful ones
transfers its aggression score to v .
• Cumulative: The cumulative aggression score of all nodes
is transferred according to their contribution, a metric cap-
turing peer pressure, also verified in [25]. For example, if
S = {u1,u2,u3} the set of nodes that succeeded, then Av =∑
i ∈S wi ∗ Ai with wi = Ai∑j∈S Aj and Ai their respective
aggression scores.
If node u succeeds, then node v gets activated in step t + 1; but
regardless of u’s success, it cannot make any further attempts to
activate v in a following step. The IC process terminates when no
more activations are possible.
3.1.4 Linear Threshold (LT). In the LT model, each node v is as-
signed a threshold θv . The process starts with an initially activated
seed set S with |S | ≤ k , similarly to the IC process. In step t , node
v is influenced by each neighbor u ∈ Nv , according to a weight
which should respect the node threshold selection. Specifically, the
alternative activation criteria at time step t are:
• Aggression:When aggression scores are used as node thresh-
olds, that is :θv = Av∀v ∈ V , thenθv ≤ ∑u ∈Nv∩Active t Au .• Power: When power scores are used as node thresholds,
that is θv = Pv∀v ∈ V , then θv ≤ ∑u ∈Nv∩Active t Pu .
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Finally, under the aggressive LT model, in contrast to the IC
case, activation has a single interpretation which is that the neigh-
bors of node v transfer their average aggression score to v: Av =∑
u∈Nv Au
|Nu | ∈ [0, 1]. In this context, the process unfolds until there
are no nodes left to become active according to the thresholds.
3.2 Aggression Minimization
Given the two models (IC and LT ), we address the problem of ag-
gression minimization by means of two different approaches, called
competitive and blocking aggression minimization, respectively.
3.2.1 Competitive AggressionMinimization (CAM). Under this min-
imization method, there are two competing diffusion processes, a
negative - also called aggressive - and a positive or educational cas-
cade. The goal of the later is to minimize the spread of the negative
one. For the negative cascade and hence the aggression diffusion,
we use the best model discovered in aggression modeling (as ex-
plained earlier), while for the positive or educational process, we
use the corresponding cascading model, and test the alternative
configurations.
Problem 1 (CAM). Given a directed network G = (V ,E), with
V and E denoting the node and edge sets, respectively, an integer
budget k and two competing diffusion processes, the aggressive and
educational, with the later having a set of parameters θ (·), the CAM
problem is to find a positive seed set S with |S | ≤ k and θ∗(·), s.t.
θ∗(·) = argminθ A(G) w.r.t. S , whereA(G) =
∑
v ∈V Av is the overall
aggression score in the network.
We now define the rules that describe the educational cascade.
Under IC , the activation probabilities follow the same notions of
the negative cascade with respect to weighting schemes: Jaccard
overlap, Power score orWeighted overlap. However, under LT , the
activation criterion as well as node thresholds should depend on
Power only. Aggression would be an inappropriate threshold as the
educational cascade intents to mitigate the effect of aggression on
the network, instead of maximizing the overall aggression score.
Using a predefined negative seed set, and according to the best
strategy of aggression modeling scenario, we allow the two pro-
cesses unfold simultaneously. If at time step t , both cascades reach
the same node v , then v gets positively activated, simulating the
fact that most probably an educated or aware user would stop
manifesting aggressive behavior.
Proceeding to the meaning of activation from the perspective of
the positive cascade - the healing effect - , we discern four possible
cases:
• Vaccination: activating user v results to A′v → 0, i.e., the
user becomes normal immediately. This hypothesis is strict.
• Aggression transfer: activating user v results to:
– IC: A′v → Au , with user u activating v
– LT: A′v →
∑
u∈Nv Au
|Nu |• Decaying aggression transfer: activating userv is affected
by a decaying factor λ capturing the distance from the source
of the information. Hence, λ = 1hops and:
– IC: A′v → λ ∗Au , with user u activating v
– LT: A′v →
∑
u∈Nv λ∗Au
|Nu |
• Hybrid: using a combination of cases 1 and 3:
A′v =
{
Vaccination , if p ≥ Av
Decaying aggression transfer ,otherwise
It is clarified here that the seed nodes of the positive cascade
are considered as the most sensitized as the educational piece of
information initiates its propagation from them. Hence, the healing
effect on them is drastic and depends on their respective aggression
scores. More formally, the new aggression score of the positive seed
nodes follows the below rule:
A′s =
{
0 if p ≥ As
As otherwise
Finally, with respect to the seed strategy of the positive cascade,
two alternatives are considered. On one hand, the seed strategy of
the negative cascade can be used, but this scenario favors the nega-
tive cascade as the decision would be based on its own specifics. On
the other hand, one of the other strategies proposed in aggression
modeling section can be exploited, regardless of the seed strategy
of the negative cascade.
3.2.2 Blocking AggressionMinimization (BAM). In contrast to CAM,
in Blocking Aggression Minimization (BAM) there is only a single
cascade, the aggressive one. The aim here is to target specific nodes
or edges to immunize. That means removing them to optimally
suppress aggression diffusion over the network. In the case of so-
cial networks, node removal is equal to banning a user which is a
drastic measure. This is why we consider the case of edge removal
also. Formally the problem is defined below:
Problem 2 (BAM-N). (node version)
Given a directed network G = (V ,E), with V and E denoting
the node and edge sets, respectively, and an integer budget k , the
problem is to find a subset of nodes S ⊆ V with |S | = k , s.t. S =
argmins ∈P (V )A(G), where A(G) =
∑
v ∈V Av is the overall aggres-
sion score in the network, and P(V ) is the Power Set of V .
Problem 3 (BAM-E). (edge version)
Given a directed network G = (V ,E), with V and E denoting
the node and edge sets, respectively, and an integer budget k , the
problem is to find a subset of edges S ⊆ E with |S | = k , s.t. S =
argmins ∈P (E)A(G), where A(G) =
∑
v ∈V Av is the overall aggres-
sion score in the network, and P(E) is the Power Set of E.
Based on the major finding of [31] and [22], for a large family of
diffusion processes, the only network parameter that determines
whether this diffusion would become an epidemic or not is the
largest eigenvalue λ of the adjacency matrix A. For this reason, in
our experiments next, we use NetShield [29] to solve the BAM-N
problem, and NetMelt [28] for BAM-E problem. Motivated by the
results of these two studies, coupled with the competitive mini-
mization explained earlier, we also implement an aggression-related
variation. In particular, instead of using the initial edge weights,
we exploit the product of the aggression scores of source and des-
tination nodes. That, is for pair (u,v) in the adjacency matrix, the
cell value now becomes Au ∗Av . However, it should be noted that
BAM is a problem that exploits offline methods, in contrast toCAM
which adjusts to the dynamics of the aggression diffusion.
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4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, and as per our Contribution 2, we present the results
of the experimental process, first with respect to aggression model-
ing using IC and LT methods (Sec. 4.2 and 4.3), and then aggression
minimization using competing cascades or blocking (Sec. 4.4).
4.1 Experimental Setup
Dataset: In this work, we focus on the Twitter social network. The
dataset used is an unlabeled Twitter network comprised of 81, 306
users and 1, 768, 149 directed edges between them [19]. To reduce
noise in the converging process, we use the strongly connected
component of this network, which consists of 68, 413 nodes and
1, 685, 163 directed edges. The edge weights are decided according
to the proposed weighting schemes described in Section 3. The
Twitter network used here is unlabelled, i.e., there is no indication
which users are normal or aggressive. Such labels are needed to
bootstrap our propagation algorithms. To that end, and using similar
methodology as in [26], we apply the prediction algorithm proposed
in [5], which provides a probability for a user to be aggressive or
not, based on their characteristics in the network and their activity.
We tune this algorithm to use only network-related features that
are available in our dataset, and apply it to compute the initial user
aggression scores of all users, which is equal to the probability of a
user being aggressive. With this classifier, 5, 594 users (or ∼8% of
the network) were given a non-zero aggression score.
Metrics used to measure aggression change:
Following similar methodology with past work [26], we measure
the state of aggression of users, and how it changes through simu-
lated time using a vector of 26 metrics. The 6 core metrics enlisted
below capture the network state with respect to users and edges
and their label at time ti :
• n: portion of normal users in the network
• a: portion of aggressive users in the network
• N-N: portion of edges that both users i and j are normal
• N-A: portion of edges that user i is normal & j aggressive
• A-N: portion of edges that user i is aggressive & j normal
• A-A: portion of edges that i and j are aggressive users
By combining these core metrics, Table 1 presents 20 additional
metrics capturing the transitions through simulated time between
ti and initial state t0.
Table 1: Validation vector transition features
t0 ti
n {n | | a}i
a {n | | a}i
N-N {N-N | | N-A | | A-N | | A-A}i
N-A {N-N | | N-A | | A-N | | A-A}i
A-N {N-N | | N-A | | A-N | | A-A}i
A-A {N-N | | N-A | | A-N | | A-A}i
Measuringmetrics in ground truth:Wewere provided with the
ground truth scores for the above metrics from [26], for both state
of individual users and their edges, as well as change of state. This
ground truth vector was computed on a smaller labelled Twitter
network of 401 users, published by [5] and re-crawled in 2019 (i.e.,
two snapshots of state in 2016 and 2019, and provided by [26]).
Comparing simulation and ground truth data: The above set
of metrics is computed for all simulated models and all their time
steps, and compared with the ground truth vector using Cosine
Similarity, i.e., Cosine(ground_truth_vector, simulation_vector). In
fact, we tried other similarity metrics, such as Pearson and Spear-
man correlations, but Cosine Similarity produced the more stable
results. This comparison establishes how closely a model’s changes
to the state of aggression of the network (in both nodes and edges)
match the ground truth data through the simulated time steps.
The careful reader will notice that the state of users is binary
(normal and aggressive). Therefore, and in order to successfully
compute the cosine of the two vectors at each simulated step, we
need to dichotomize the users’ state. For this, we experimented
with different thresholds (TA) on the users’ aggression scores (TA =
{0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9}) and then computed cosine similarity for each
newly-dichotomized simulation vector. We concluded that results
withTA = 0.4 exhibit best overall similarity with ground truth data.
Thus, all results presented next are focus on TA = 0.4.
Statistical Tests: For the IC modeling, we run every experiment 10
times due to the inherent randomized nature of the activation pro-
cess. Additionally, when Random is used as the seed strategy, each
experiment is executed 10 more times, leading to a total of 100 exe-
cutions. To present these results, we use Cumulative Distribution
Functions (CDF). To validate whether there is significant difference
in parameter values, we employ One-Way ANOVA, followed by a
pairwise post-hoc Tukey’s HSD test, to spot the exact value of the sig-
nificant parameter. We identify statistically significant differences
at p-value < 0.001 for both tests. For the LT modeling, there is no
probabilistic step to be taken, and thus, we run each experiment
only once, except for the case of Random seed strategy, for which
we execute each setup 10 times and acquire average performance.
These results are presented in a table were appropriate.
Simulation Framework:We designed and implemented a modu-
lar and extensible simulation framework to execute the modeling
and minimization experiments. It is written in Python, it is open
sourced, and allows fine-grained control of simulation parameters,
to enable reproducible experiments, and future extensions.
4.2 Aggression Modeling
In the next paragraphs, we present and analyze the results for se-
lecting 1) Seed set strategy, 2) Weighting scheme, and 3) Activation
criterion (for IC) and Threshold strategy (for LT ).
4.2.1 Seed Selection Strategy. For the rest of the experimental pro-
cess, we distinguish the results of IC and LT -based models due to
the different presentation processes. We set the seed size (budget
k) to 5594, to match the number of users with non-zero aggression
score. Regarding seed strategy, Top Aggressive is unnecessary as
the selected seed size allows the use of all aggressive users.
Figure 1 presents the results regarding IC-based models. For
brevity, the exhaustive list of experiments is not presented, as simi-
lar patterns were observed. From these results, we note a small, yet
statistically significant dominance of the network-feature strate-
gies, Single Discount (SD) and Degree Discount (DD). Specifically,
Tukey’s HSD test found that degree-based strategies (SD and DD)
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(a)WS : Weighted; AC : Random (b)WS : Power; AC : Cumulative (c)WS : Jaccard; AC : Top
Figure 1: Cosine similarities for IC based on various seed strategies, weighting schemes (WS) and activation criteria (AC). Omit-
ted combinations presented similar behavior.
(a) AC : Random (b) AC : Top (c) AC : Cumulative
Figure 2: Cosine similarities for IC based on different weighting schemes and Activation Criteria (AC). Seed strategy: SD.
are significantly better than others. Additionally, for Power- and
Weighted-based graphs, SD and DD do not have significant differ-
ences, while in Jaccard, SD is prevalent. Hence, for the IC models,
SD seems the appropriate seed strategy due to its reduced compu-
tation cost compared to DD.
Turning to LT -based configurations (Table 2), we note that DD,
although applicable, is not compatible with the theoretical back-
ground of LT model. If we focus on the configurations of Jaccard,
we see that similar to the case of IC , the most dominant strategy
is SD. Also, Power and Weighted results do not show significant
difference between the various seed strategies. Thus overall, SD is
the most prevalent seed strategy for LT -based models too.
Table 2: Cosine similarity for LT models, with different
weighting schemes (WS), seed strategies (SS) and threshold
strategies (TS). ∗ = all parameter values
WS SS TS Cosine
Jaccard Random * 0.690
Jaccard All Aggressive * 0.688
Jaccard SD A | P 0.691 | 0.690
Power * * 0.689
Weighted * * 0.689
4.2.2 Weighting Scheme. Given the selected seed strategy SD, we
now analyze the results on different weighting schemes. Figure 2
shows that Jaccard is the best weighting scheme, regardless of the
activation criterion, also confirmed statistically with ANOVA and
Tukey tests.
Moving to the LT -based configurations, Table 2 again presents
that the best performance is achieved when using Jaccard. Addition-
ally, Weighted and Power as weighting schemes do not present any
practical differences - deviations are observed on the sixth decimal
point - constituting them inappropriate weighting schemes. Thus,
we conclude with Jaccard as the weighting scheme for LT as well.
4.2.3 Activation Criterion and Threshold Strategy. Up to now, we
investigated the various possible configurations from amacroscopic
point of view, to conclude to SD as the best seed selection strat-
egy and Jaccard as the best weighting scheme. Next, we look into
activation criteria and threshold strategies to select best possible
setups. Specifically, Figure 3 shows that Cumulative activation strat-
egy is the best, while there is no clear distinction between Top and
Random strategies, validated by ANOVA too. Also, Tukey’s HSD
test highlights the superiority of Cumulative over Top and Random,
whose results overlap. This prevalence is explained by the crucial
effect that a user’s neighborhood has on them, as it is also pointed
out by the General Aggression Model [1].
Proceeding to LT models, we also focus on the experiments
regarding Jaccard with SD. Table 2 shows that Aggression-based
thresholds perform slightly better and, hence, they should be used
to model aggression propagation. This observation is intuitive, as it
suggests that the higher the aggressiveness of a user, the easier to
propagate it - a feature that enables the overall aggression diffusion
process over LT .
4.2.4 Snapshot Evolution. In the previous experimental cases, the
diffusion process was let to unfold until completion (i.e., after all
possible time steps), and then the similarity with ground truth
CIKM’20, 19-23 October 2020, Galway, Ireland Poiitis, et al.
Figure 3: Cosine similarities
for IC for different activa-
tion criteria. Seed Strategy:
SD, Weighting Scheme: Jac-
card. TA = 0.4.
Figure 4: Snapshot evolu-
tion for IC and LT , with
SD & Jaccard. IC-specific:
Cumulative. LT -specific: Ag-
gression score.
was calculated. However, there could be an intermediate time step
(snapshot) in the propagation that can better match the ground
truth change of state. To investigate if this is the case, we created
snapshots of the diffusion process at the end of every time step and
track the corresponding results.
Figure 4 shows for the two modeling methods, the similarity
with ground truth at each time step. In both IC and LT , the per-
formance decreases rapidly within the first steps and gradually
stabilizes in the last ones. This trend shows that aggression prob-
ably does not propagate that deeply into the network (remember
that steps here mean graph hops), and that our models better match
the ground truth in the first or second time steps of the diffusion
process. Interestingly, the stable behavior for the last steps vali-
dates the integrity of the convergence value studied earlier. When
we studied this trend with two more similarity metrics (Pearson
and Spearman correlations), we found that Pearson behaves like
Cosine, but Spearman presents an early increase with a steady drop
afterwards. However, we decided to focus our analysis on Cosine,
since the normality requirement for Pearson is not satisfied, and
Cosine is more sensitive to subtle changes than Spearman.
Takeaways: Combining the above experimental observations,
it is concluded that aggression diffusion over social networks can
be modeled with a cascading model, such as IC or LT , fulfilling the
first part of Contributions 2 and 3. For both models, the best seed
strategy is SD, meaning that the most accurate models of aggres-
sion diffusion should initiate their process from the most central
points in the network. Moreover, for both cases, the best perform-
ing weighting scheme is Jaccard which expresses that relations
are formed based on users’ neighborhood similarity. Furthermore,
specific to IC-based models, activation criterion should be set to
Cumulative, enabling the whole neighborhood of a node to affect its
aggression state, while for LT -based models, an Aggression-based
threshold strategy is the best, as it enables the overall dissemi-
nation process. Lastly, the diffusion process should unfold until
convergence to achieve a stable state.
4.3 Case Study: modeling aggression diffusion
To evaluate the best IC and LT models (as concluded earlier), we
apply them to the small labeled Twitter network of the prediction
algorithm [5]. There are labels for two network snapshots (for
2016 and 2019), while users are labeled as normal or aggressive
in both. Using the user labels of the first snapshot, we run the IC
and LT models and measure the AUC of the predicted labels, vs.
the ones of the 2nd snapshot. The AUC achieved by IC (with SD,
Jaccard, and Cumulative) is 0.82, while for LT (with SD, Jaccard
and Aggression) is 0.89. Thus, both configurations perform well in
modeling aggression diffusion, and LT seems to provide slightly
better performance, with fewer false positives (aggressors).
4.4 Aggression Minimization
The second part of the experimental process pertains to aggres-
sion minimization (CAM and BAM problems). To address theCAM
problem, a competitive cascade process is exploited aiming at de-
creasing the final aggression score of the network, while for BAM ,
the proposed node and edge blocking mechanisms select the nodes
to remove before the launch of the aggressive cascade.
4.4.1 Competitive Aggression Minimization. With respect to CAM ,
the positive cascade should be similar to the negative one, i.e., for
both IC and LT models, and both positive and negative cascades
the chosen weighting scheme is Jaccard. For the IC , the activation
strategy is Cumulative, and for LT the threshold strategy is Ag-
gression. Thus, the two cascades compete in equal terms and the
rest of parameters are investigated. The experimentation comprises
of the different seed strategies for the positive cascade, as well as
the various healing mechanisms: Vaccination, Transfer, Decaying
transfer, and Hybrid.
Here, we focus on the best configurations of the modeling phase
mentioned earlier. Figure 5 presents aggression evolution during
the competitive cascade process, for various seed and healing strate-
gies on the IC models. Y-axis presents the ratio of loss or gain with
respect to the case where no healing is applied. First, regarding
the seed strategy of the positive cascade, it is shown that, Random
presents the best results for every healing mechanism reaching
57.8% aggression reduction, while DD follows with 57.3%. Seed
strategies SD and All Aggressive follow with 55.3% and 53.5%, re-
spectively. Thus, Random is the best option when computational
cost is important, while DD could be chosen if stability is necessary.
With respect to the healing strategies, regardless of the positive
seed strategy, the Transfer healing presents the worst performance
with a best-case reduction of 8%. This behavior is due to the sim-
ple aggression score transferring, regardless of the result on the
corresponding node. The rest of the healing mechanisms perform
similarly, no matter the seed strategy. In particular, Vaccination is
the most dominant mechanism, achieving 57.3% aggression reduc-
tion, while Decaying transfer and Hybrid follow with ∼57%. These
results are intuitive, since Vaccinationmakes the strong assumption
that nodes get completely healed, whereas Decaying transfer is a
more relaxed and realistic version of Vaccination, and Hybrid lies
in between them.
Another critical factor of a healing strategy’s efficiency is the
number of nodes that get activated by the negative cascade. This is
important since the same aggression reduction on a larger number
of activated nodes expresses a more efficient mechanism. In par-
ticular, all healing mechanisms, except Transfer, activate about the
same number of nodes (plots omitted for brevity). Combining the
results on aggression reduction with number of activated nodes, we
conclude that Vaccination is the best healing mechanism, but due to
its mostly theoretical nature, Decaying transfer could be assumed
to minimize aggression in IC-based models.
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(a) All Aggressive seed strategy (b) Random seed strategy (c) DD seed strategy (d) SD seed strategy
Figure 5: Aggression evolution on IC models under CAM problem, using different healing strategies.
(a) All Aggressive seed strategy (b) Random seed strategy (c) SD seed strategy
Figure 6: Aggression evolution on LT models under CAM problem, using different healing strategies.
Proceeding to the LT models, Figure 6 presents amore interesting
set of results than IC . Here, DD is not a viable option as it has been
explained already. For the rest of the strategies, SD is dominant,
achieving up to 92% reduction, with Random following closely with
90%. Moving to the healing strategies, Vaccination achieves the
best reduction of approximately 92%, but, in contrast to the IC
case, it is the only one that preserves the reduction during the
whole process. This can be explained by the fact that Vaccination
completely deactivates the touched nodes, and, thus, they have
zero effect on their neighbors during the subsequent steps. On
the contrary, the rest of methods can not preserve the reduced
aggression levels suggesting a potential inefficiency of competitive
cascades on LT models. Hence, we observe that in LT models, the
most possible and realistic reduction starts from 5% and can raise
up to 20% using as healing mechanism the Hybrid.
Regarding the activated nodes during each propagation process,
Vaccination activates the least number of nodes, while Decaying
transfer stimulates 2x more nodes compared toHybrid in most cases.
Also, considering the theoretical nature of Vaccination, Decaying
Transfer should be prioritized as a healing mechanism.
4.4.2 Blocking Aggression Minimization. Moving to the second
minimization problem (BAM), the results of four methods combin-
ing: 1) node or 2) edge blocking (removal), while using a) Jaccard as
edge weight in the adjacency matrix A, or b) the modified version
with the aggression scores (please see details in Sec. 4.4) are briefly
discussed and compared to a no-immunization process as baseline.
For node and edge blocking, NetShield [29] and NetMelt [28] algo-
rithms were used, respectively, to select nodes or edges to remove.
For IC , the aggression-based variations do not present significant
improvement over the baseline. Aggression reduction is possible -
although smaller than competitive cascades - by exploiting node
removal, achieving a reduction of 8%. We note that the number of
removed nodes is 5594, equal to the seed size of the competitive
cascade process. However, when edge blocking is examined, the
overall aggression score is, in fact, doubled, regardless of the type of
the matrixA. This unpredictable behavior is caused by the combina-
tion of significant edge removal and the degree-based seed strategy
of the underlying diffusion process. Moreover, to let NetMelt reach
the same number of nodes as NetShield, ∼470k edges have to be
removed, which is clearly unrealistic.
For LT , edge removal (with both types of A) presents a switching
behavior of 1% increase and decrease in overall aggression, in rela-
tion to the baseline of no immunization. However, these fluctuations
are small and do not lead to a significant outcome on aggression
minimization. Regarding node removal, there is a better perfor-
mance in terms of aggression minimization, since the reduction
reaches 6% for the Jaccard-basedA, and 8% for the aggression-based
case. In general, the aggression alternative of the adjacency matrix
seems to benefit the process, but more in-depth research is needed
to understand its tradeoffs.
Lastly, regarding the number of activated nodes, in comparison
to the competitive cascades, the immunization methods here tend
to activate 4x times more nodes overall. Again, for brevity the
respective results are omitted.
Takeaways: Aggression minimization through competitive cas-
cades outperforms blocking techniques. Specifically, using IC mod-
els, we achieve a reduction of 57% of the initial total aggression
score of the network, while with blocking methods up to a reduc-
tion of 8%. Using LT models, even though competitive cascades
are more efficient in terms of aggression reduction, the gradual
aggression score increase during the diffusion process suggests that
node blocking should be preferred. These observations cover the
second and last part of Contributions 2 and 3.
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5 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this work, the dual problem of aggression modeling and ag-
gression minimization in online social networks, and specifically
Twitter, was examined. To the best of our knowledge, aggression
modeling has been addressed only in [26], where it was approached
through opinion dynamics instead of cascading models. Both ap-
proaches present comparable performance in modeling real Twitter
data on aggression diffusion, while having some distinguishing fea-
tures regarding the process and convergence conditions. We believe
our work advances the community’s understanding on aggression
diffusion one step further, while determining the most prevalent
of the two methods is left for a follow-up work. Apart from ag-
gression modeling, however, we are the first to address aggression
minimization. We exploit models from the domains of competitive
cascades and immunization and discover strategies to implement
them as minimization methods.
In this paper, first, we showed that aggression diffusion can
indeed be modeled with both IC- and LT -based propagation pro-
cesses, as they can reach a good cosine similarity with ground
truth of ∼70%. Our results showed that aggression diffusion bene-
fits from starting the propagation from the most central, but not
necessarily the most aggressive nodes in the network. Additionally,
the weighting scheme for graph edges should utilize the Jaccard
overlap between social circles of users, to capture the importance
of neighborhood similarity. Regarding the specifics of each model,
Cumulative was the best activation criterion for IC , as it engulfs the
team influence on information propagation. For LT , Aggression was
the best threshold strategy, suggesting that high aggressiveness is
easier to propagate and hence enabling aggression diffusion.
With respect to aggression minimization, competitive cascades
achieved a total of 57% reduction with IC , and 5-20% in LT models,
while node blocking methods reached ∼8% reduction in both IC and
LT . Edge blocking is inappropriate, as it interferes with the degree
of nodes, making it incompatible with the degree-based SD seed
strategy of the aggression cascade. Furthermore, in LT scenario,
competitive cascades could not preserve their efficiency and hence
the more stable blocking methods should be preferred.
Regarding competitive cascades, the similar behavior of the most
prevalent seed strategies allows a tradeoff between stability and
computational cost. Specifically, Random strategy achieved high
performance with low computational cost, whileDD presented sim-
ilar performance with more stable behavior. In LT models, where
DD is not applicable, SD was chosen. Moreover, Decaying Transfer
was the most appropriate healing mechanism, despite Vaccination’s
higher performance. This is because Vaccination presumes that
users affected by a positive piece of information, such as a cyberbul-
lying sensitizing campaign, will not switch back to abusive behavior.
This assumption is rather theoretical, and not easily applicable or
proven in a real-world scenario.
Combining the observations on competitive cascades and block-
ing techniques, and to reduce aggression in online social networks,
we propose the use of awareness campaigns (e.g., sharing posts
for eliminating racism or hate speech), instead of banning users.
In this way, a less intrusive, but yet more effective minimization
method can be implemented. Concluding, for aggression modeling
and minimization, there are various extensions of this work that
can be investigated in the near future:
(1) Implement further theoretical aggression features in the
diffusion models, to better capture aggression dynamics on
real networks.
(2) Investigate various thresholds that enable an epidemic spread
of aggression under different virus-spreading models.
(3) Examine ways to incorporate offline blocking methods into
the diffusion process and dynamically minimize aggression.
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